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Abstract
The priority rule in science has been interpreted as a behavior regu-
lator for the scientific community, which benefits society by adequately
structuring the distribution of intellectual labor across pre-existing re-
search programs. Further, it has been lauded as part of society’s “grand
reward scheme” because it fairly rewards people for the benefits they
produce. But considerations about how news of scientific developments
spreads throughout a scientific community at large suggest that the pri-
ority rule is something else entirely, which can disadvantage historically
underrepresented or otherwise marginalized social groups.
1 Introduction
In scientific practice, discoveries of sufficient impact appear to generate certain
quantities of prestige, which are to be bestowed upon particular scientists by
the scientific community at large. The priority rule is a broad descriptive norm
concerning the proper allocation of that prestige. The inference toward such a
norm comes via an observed phenomenon in the history of science whereby, in
situations of multiple discovery, disputes about who deserves the prestige that
comes associated with a discovery are often fought by way of assertions about
who was first to make it.
That the history of science is laden with instances of multiple discovery
has been known since at least the early 1900s. Ogburn and Thomas [1922]
document 148 such cases in a variety of high-profile domains of scientific inquiry,
and mention in a footnote there there are disputes over priority of discovery in
many cases. (In one example, the authors report that the discovery of the
cellular basis of animal and vegetable tissue was claimed by seven independent
researchers in or around the year 1839.) The particular investigation of these
so-called “priority disputes” was eventually taken up (famously) by Merton
[1957]. Merton sought to explain, by appeal to the institutions and norms of
science, how otherwise dignified and reserved scientists would, when involved in
instances of multiple discovery, often fight tooth and nail against the possibility
that anyone but them bore responsibility for the discovery.
What Merton [1957] observes is that in cases of multiple discovery, the pres-
tige that results from the discovery is generally awarded to just one of the
independent parties involved. This state of affairs naturally engenders disputes
over which party ought to enjoy access to that new prestige. In the event of
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such a dispute, Merton argues convincingly that the rhetoric of the dispute of-
ten centers on the lack of sufficient time-stamped evidence about which of a set
of claimants was first to make the key insights that drove the content of the
multiple discovery, as well as accusations about whether those key insights were
indeed made independently of knowledge of the work done by any of the other
claimants.
Merton makes sense of this state of affairs in terms of the perception amongst
scientists of intellectual property rights, for which it is the case that the first
person responsible for the invention of a new bit of intellectual property ought
to enjoy the profit that comes from it. This feature of the account— that
the prestige that is generated by a particularly impactful discovery is taken to
belong to whoever is truly first to produce it— is what has come to be known
as the “priority rule” in science.
Strevens [2003], following a lead from Kitcher [1990], famously formalizes
the priority rule in science as a particular manifestation of a “grand reward
scheme” (p. 76) that exists in our society, which allocates prestige associated
with new discoveries in such a way that incentivizes scientists to optimally
distribute themselves across a variety of programs of research. Moreover, he
argues that this epistemic role of the priority rule provides extrinsic justification
for the continued existence of the rule. In addition to this epistemic justification,
Strevens argues that the priority rule rewards people based on the benefit they
confer – since only the first to make the discovery produces a benefit to society,
it is regarded as fair that only the first discoverer is rewarded.
However, in Strevens’s account, it is assumed that whoever makes the dis-
covery first will be assigned priority by the scientific community (or, at least,
scientists believe that this is how priority assignments work). While it may often
be clear who is ultimately responsible for a particular discovery, the history of
science is punctuated by the (perceived) failure of the community to adequately
implement a priority rule like that which Strevens formulates. Merton’s origi-
nal evidential impetus for talking about priority was that it is priority disputes
which are commonplace in the history of science and which are fought so ani-
matedly, but these disputes are idealized away in Streven’s priority rule. In light
of this substantial gap between Strevens’s idealization of scientific practice and
Merton’s original evidence for the priority rule, the first goal of the present paper
is to offer a different formulation of the priority rule than that which Strevens
provides, based on taking seriously considerations about the social mechanisms
by which credit is assigned by individuals in the scientific community who may
not always agree on who should be given priority.
Having argued for the appropriateness our new formulation of the priority
rule as descriptive of scientific practice, the second goal of the present paper is
to evaluate the consequences of scientific communities dispersing prestige. We
introduce a model in which inequities in the underlying social network of the
scientists in a community can allow prestige to accumulate in the hands of those
historically well-positioned within the scientific community. We show how his-
torically underrepresented or otherwise marginalized minority groups can suffer
in the context of receiving prestige for particular discoveries. Notably, this dis-
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advantage arises due to facts about the social structure of scientific communities,
rather than due to any differences in skill or achievement, or any bias against
the minority population.1
2 From priority disputes to the priority rule and
back
The operational notion of credit in priority disputes is not as immediate payment
for services rendered. What is at stake is the accumulation of prestige, or
wide-scale credit, in the eyes of the community (considered as a single body).
Merton [1957] lists several examples of how the community confers prestige to
individuals, including eponymy (p. 643), honorifics such as the Nobel Prize,
introduction into “honorary academies” like the Royal Society and the French
Academy of Sciences (p. 644), and posthumous recognition by historians (p.
645). To this list of examples, Strevens [2003] adds “reputation, a sizable office,
the rapt attention of graduate students and the like” (p. 57). Based on these
examples then, prestige appears to be a retrospective quantity, conferred on
individuals when the community as a whole has come to associate them with
the corresponding discoveries.
A key observation is that in most cases of disputes about who ought to
receive the prestige that corresponds to a particular discovery, at least one
of the parties involved perceives there to be a great injustice afoot: they are
being denied access to newfound prestige because another party involved is, for
whatever reason, unrelated to the content of the discovery, in a better position
to win the prestige instead. As Merton argues, in cases of multiple discovery, a
particular kind of dispute can emerge that is focused on the precise times of the
scientists’ respective discoveries. As Merton [1957], quoting Arago, points out:
“ ‘about the same time’ proves nothing; questions as to priority may depend on
weeks, on days, on hours, on minutes” (p. 658). Merton proceeds to explain how
such priority disputes emerge as unsurprising artifacts of the institutions and
norms that govern scientific practice. And so is born the notion of a ‘priority
rule’ in science.
Strevens takes Merton’s work as motivation to formalize the priority rule in
such a way that he can assess its impact on scientific inquiry. In particular, he
models the priority rule as a reward system characterized by two “parts” (p.
56):
First, rewards to scientists are allocated solely on the basis of actual
achievement, rather than, for example, on the basis of effort or talent
invested. Second, no discovery of a fact or a procedure but the first
counts as an actual achievement.
Strevens then argues that, from the perspective of a central planner, although
the priority rule may seem harmful initially (as compared to, e.g., a rule that
1For other cases where minority disadvantage can arise in absense of biases, see e.g. Bruner
[2019], and Rubin and O’Connor [2018].
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rewards scientists for hard work and talent), it is actually beneficial for scientific
inquiry. In his formal setup, it is by virtue of the priority rule that intellectual
labor is efficiently distributed across various research programs with differing
odds of success. The basic idea is that scientists balance the odds that a re-
search program will be successful and the odds that, if their research program
is successful, they will be the one to make the discovery. Therefore, scientists
do not all abandon other lines of research to join the most promising-looking
research program. Instead, they distribute themselves among research programs
(with more scientists working within more promising-looking programs). Oth-
ers have since used this same basic modeling framework to discuss, for example,
incentives to publish early and frequently [Heesen, 2018] or share intermedi-
ate results [Heesen, 2017], disincentives to replicate previous findings [Romero,
2017], and how scientists are motivated by a combination of truth and credit
[Zollman, 2018].
It seems odd that in this formulation of the priority rule, Strevens excludes
the possibility of genuine conflict in cases of multiple discovery. After all, it
was a litany of such conflicts in Merton’s article that gives rise to an inference
toward the priority rule in the first place. This gap between Merton’s treatment
of priority disputes and Strevens’s account of the priority rule is highlighted
by the shift in Strevens’s article away from Merton’s historical cases of priority
disputes and toward scenarios in which different research groups approaching
scientific problems are in a winner-takes-all race toward the resolution of those
problems. Unlike in Merton’s work, “discoveries” are now the resolutions of
those problems and prestige is doled out to whoever wins the race.
While such scenarios certainly occur in science, they are not the scenarios in
which Merton’s work about priority is most relevant. Where is the disconnect?
One answer can be found in an ambiguity in Strevens’s initial framing of the
matter (p. 58): “The question with which I am concerned, then, may be put
thus: why does the scientific community disburse prestige in accordance with
the priority rule rather than... some alternative scheme?” Nestled implicitly in
the statement of this question is the descriptive plural action claim:
The scientific community disburses prestige.
Following the terms provided by Ludwig [2016], this claim can either be read
as a distributive action sentence or as a collective action sentence. Moreover
(following the form of Ludwig’s argument, p. 131), we may understand the
ambiguity between these two readings to wholly consist in an ambiguity of
scope:
On the distributive reading, we mean that each of [the scientists
within the community] were separately sole agents of [the disbursal
of prestige] in a certain way. On the collective reading we mean
that for [the disbursal of prestige] each of [the scientists within the
community] (and no one else) was an agent of it in a certain way.
As an example, we may read the sentence “Two people built boats” as claim-
ing either that two people independently built boats (distributive reading) or
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that two people came together to build boats, e.g., with one sawing and the
other hammering pieces together (collective reading). Similarly, scientists could
separately take part in the community’s disbursal of prestige by each indepen-
dently engaging in a prestige-relevant task— e.g. individually attributing credit
(distributive reading), or they could come together as a whole to disburse the
prestige as a group (collective reading). Strevens seems to take for granted the
collective reading of this plural action claim when he idealizes away the mat-
ter of how that quantity of prestige comes to be disbursed by the community,
considered as a singular body.
Meanwhile, the distributive reading suggests a rich story to be hypothesized
about the internal social dynamics that go into the disbursal of that quantity.
It is therefore only on the distributive reading that we are subsequently free to
study how the implementation of a priority rule in the case of multiple discovery
can give rise to priority disputes. A formulation of the priority rule that better
coheres with Merton’s work, i.e. which gives rise to morally-charged priority
disputes in cases of multiple discovery, should involve considerations about pre-
cisely those social mechanisms that are implied by the distributive reading that
Strevens avoids.
One fears that whatever Strevens’s formulation of the priority rule does to
distribute intellectual labor theoretically across a variety of competing research
programs, it is simply not the priority rule for which we have thorough evidence
is present throughout the history of science. The history of science is replete with
individual mis-attributions of credit that result in the “wrong” person winding
up with prestige. In the case of eponymy, Stigler’s Law, autologically coined
by Stigler [1980] himself, is the descriptive rule that (humorously) captures this
phenomenon: no scientific discovery is named after its original discoverer (p.
147). In section 3, we argue that the social structure of science plays a role in
determining who individuals assign credit to, and thus who receives the prestige.
But first, we provide evidence for a distributive reading of the priority rule.
2.1 Evidence for the distributive reading
The scientific community, though in some respects quite hierarchical, is not
centrally governed. The awarding of prestige, though associated with individ-
ual accomplishments, often happens at no particular moment in time. That
individuals come to be awarded prestige at no particular time by no particular
decision made on behalf of the community strongly suggests that the disbursal
of that prestige is not a single act of which each scientist was an agent. Instead,
it seems more plausible to view the disbursal of that prestige as following from
the members of the community separately taking actions that need not indi-
vidually resemble the awarding of prestige. That is, individual scientists assign
credit, and along the way prestige is conferred by the scientific community. (No
one gains the respect of a community because one person gives them credit for a
discovery, but if the members of a community all generally associate a particular
scientist with a discovery, that scientist will receive the associated reputational
benefits, etc.)
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To support this alternative view, it is helpful to recall cases from the history
of science in which the prestige disbursed by the community as a whole follows as
a consequence of a sufficient number of individuals each engaging in practices
other than prestige-disbursing. The three cases we will offer in this regard
are drawn from the (computational) social sciences, evolutionary biology, and
quantum mechanics. In discussing each of them, our goal will be to emphasize
just one feature common to all three: individuals attributing credit as they go
about their ordinary affairs are what, in aggregate, determines to whom prestige
comes to be awarded.
James M. Sakoda beat Thomas C. Schelling to the public invention of com-
putational models of segregation: the latter’s model amounts to a special case of
one of the former’s, which was printed in the previous issue of the same journal
in which the latter’s model appeared. Moreover, Sakoda’s model had its origins
in his dissertation work twenty years earlier, furthering his claim to priority on
the subject [Hegselmann, 2017]. Nonetheless, Schelling undoubtedly enjoys the
prestige that surrounds the subject: the basic checkerboard model of segrega-
tion is equivalently called the “Schelling model” (an instance of eponymy), the
so-named Schelling model is taught in any introductory course on the subject
of agent-based computational models in the social sciences, and Schelling won a
Nobel prize in economics in part for his work on such models (a prime example
of an honorific).
But as Hegselmann [2017, p. 5-6] argues, “No crime happened, no conspir-
acy was involved. No discrimination whatsoever was at work.... as to the main
actors, nobody did anything wrong.” Instead, one deciding factor it seems was
Schelling’s subsequent decision to write a book, developing many of the ideas
in his paper, accessible for much broader audiences than just those computer
scientists who happen to additionally be interested in modeling social dynamics.
Those broader audiences were encouraged to try out small, table-top examples
of the checkerboard models under scrutiny, whereupon: “They all had experi-
enced how surprisingly fast, right before their eyes, certain unexpected, dramatic
macro structures evolved, generated by fairly innocent looking micro-motives–
an eye-opening phenomenon par excellence” [Hegselmann, 2017, p. 87]. This
got those broader audiences talking about the demonstrative power of these
simple computational models, and they were talking about it in the context of
Schelling’s work. Whatever reasons we give for why Schelling enjoys the pres-
tige, an indispensable part of the story is that he enjoys it because individuals
separately began to associate him with the discovery, rather than because the
scientific community wholesale decided that it was he who was responsible for
the discovery.
One finds a situation of a similar form in evolutionary biology, wherein the
distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biology is attributed to
Ernst Mayr. As Laland et al. [2011] point out, this distinction was made well
before Mayr wrote about it in the 1960s (they cite an article by J. Baker written
in the 1930s). Nonetheless, Mayr’s article is what ostensibly led to the distinc-
tion’s widespread acceptance in evolutionary theory. Moreover, even as Laland
et al. [2011] flag the trivia that Mayr was not the first to make the distinc-
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tion, they consistently refer to it as “Mayr’s distinction”. This is illuminating
because, as an evidently conscious decision of the authors in that article, it de-
mands explanation. One prudent explanation is that of historical usage: since
people started citing Mayr when talking about the distinction, it subsequently
became known as his distinction. Hence, even when the pre-history of Mayr’s
work is acknowledged, Mayr’s legacy continues to enjoy the prestige.
A final case worth mentioning is one in the history of physics, particularly
in the development of mature quantum mechanics. In 1932, von Neumann pub-
lished an alleged “no-go” proof of the viability of hidden-variables underpin-
ning quantum mechanical behavior in an ultimately deterministic theory. Grete
Hermann evidently discovered a flaw in the scope of the proof in 1935, yet this
discovery was “not widely known at the time, and her criticism had no impact
whatsoever” [Seevinck, 2016, p. 107]. In 1964, John Bell happened on the
same such discovery, in the aftermath of the development of Bohmian mechan-
ics (whose success as a deterministic, hidden-variables alternative to quantum
mechanics clearly stood as proof of the alleged impossible).
There are a few details to note in this case: Hermann, though formally
trained as mathematician under Emmy Noether and in contact with the physi-
cists of note in the day, nonetheless identified primarily as a philosopher in the
neo-Kantian tradition [Hansen-Schaberg, 2016]. She was also a woman (as well
as political activist), working in a time and discipline that was hostile and ex-
clusionary. Finally, Bell enjoyed the benefit of offering Bohmian mechanics as
a demonstration of his point (whereas in 1935, Hermann could only conclude
that the possibility of such a hidden-variables theory was left open). For some
combination of these reasons, and perhaps others, Hermann’s contributions at
the time were overlooked. Our point here is that following this neglect, when
most scientists were for the first time ready to credit someone for identifying
the ostensible flaw in von Neumann’s proof (that is, following the development
of Bohmian mechanics), Bell’s independent study of the subject led him to be
the recipient of that credit, and, eventually following, prestige.
In each of these historical anecdotes, there are myriad reasons one could give
for why a particular person enjoys the prestige. The common feature across
each of these histories is that the recipient of the prestige associated with a
discovery of some or other form is not the same individual as who was first
responsible for the relevant discovery, but rather was the same individual as
who first became largely known to be associated with the discovery. We take
this as evidence from the history of science for a distributive reading of the
claim “the scientific community disburses prestige”: in each of these cases, each
of the scientists within the relevant community happened to attach credit for
the relevant discovery to some or other scientist. Meanwhile, by virtue of each
such scientist acting in this way separately, i.e. as a sole agent, prestige came
eventually to be disbursed by the community to the individual that most of the
scientists credited.
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2.2 Credit attribution contests
Taking a lead from the historical cases just discussed and the distributive reading
of the disbursal of prestige that those cases support, we offer the following
perspective. Scientific developments are not immediately known by everyone
in a scientific community. News of them spreads throughout the community,
rather, through an informal social network that spans the community. Insofar
as that development proves valuable to the community, the party responsible
for that development enjoys a corresponding quantity of prestige. Of course,
it need not be the case that every individual in the community has assigned
credit; the community may just as well bestow prestige when the vast majority
has learned about the development (whereupon any stragglers learn about the
development as do those outside of the community, as discussed below).
In cases of multiple discovery, just as in any other case, when individu-
als within the community go looking for news of pertinent developments, they
generally come to associate a development with whomever they first learn is re-
sponsible for it. The difference is that in the case of multiple discovery, a large
majority of the community may all come to associate the development with one
of the parties involved, such that prestige comes to be bestowed upon that party
(as it is normally) while any other party that independently produced the same
development is neglected.
At risk of being denied the prestige that they believe they are due on the
basis of their work, any party that does not enjoy the support of the majority
will protest that they ought to receive the prestige that in other circumstances
would have been awarded to them, for instance had the social network just
happened to have been structured differently. As Merton [1957] notes, those
in the minority who believe the wrong person received the prestige will often
protest, too. In other words, the function of such a protest is obvious: to change
individuals’ associations as to who gets credit for a discovery. This is because
the conferring of prestige by the community occurs when individuals within the
community associate a particular person with a discovery.
Finally, we have arrived at a priority rule that falls directly out of the nature
of priority disputes, such that the priority rule is what gives rise, in instances
of multiple discovery, to priority disputes. We state the rule as follows:
The Priority Rule: Prestige associated with a particular scientific
development is bestowed wholesale upon a particular party as a con-
sequence of a large majority of the surrounding community having
all individually come to associate that development with them.
Given this rule, in instances of multiple discovery, we may imagine ‘credit attri-
bution contests’ between individuals within the community who independently
produce similar developments at the same time.
One might object that a large majority is not enough – surely all or nearly all
of the community must agree on a discoverer for that person to get the prestige.
There are reasons we think a large majority would suffice. First, in the instance
of a priority dispute between the two competing parties, one might image that
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those who enjoy the support of the large majority are more likely to win the
priority dispute: along the lines of the observation by Merton just mentioned,
those who enjoy the support of the large majority also enjoy a larger collection
of possible defenders, ready to fight against an instance of perceived injustice.
Second, even without a priority dispute, a large majority of scientists com-
ing to associate one person with a discovery might be sufficient for prestige to
be bestowed on that individual. For instance, when using reference to a name
as short-hand for an idea that one’s interlocutor will understand (e.g. using
“Schelling’s segregation model” to refer to a mathematical model whereby min-
imal conditions for segregation are demonstrated), the most effective name to
choose is the name most well-known in connection to that idea (one’s interlocu-
tor is less likely to know of Sakoda’s work). One might imagine that there is
some tipping point, or threshold, at which it becomes prudent for individuals
wishing to communicate in this way to defer to the use of the more well-known
name, irrespective of who they individually have associated with it.2 Similarly,
new members of the community, hoping to signal their understanding of the
field, will think to provide the name most people within their community asso-
ciate with the discovery, lest they be thought ignorant. Finally, it is reasonable
to expect that the more well-known name would be used in review articles writ-
ten by members of the community, to communicate the results of their sub-field
to a wider audience (and to the few members of the community who may not
have already heard of the discovery), and so both the broader scientific com-
munity and, eventually, the public at large and history books would come to
recognize the more well-known name.3
In the next section, we will formalize these credit attribution contests so as to
study the influence of network structure on the awarding of prestige in instances
of genuine multiple discovery. This model is meant to be descriptive of scientific
practice, not prescriptive of how a central planner ought to distribute prestige.
As such, we do not compare the efficacy of different mechanisms for dispersing
prestige; rather, we take prestige to simply be that which is disbursed in the
way we have so far described. We make two arguments based on this model.
First, we argue that this more descriptively accurate picture of scientific priority
does not necessarily align with our ideas of fairly rewarding people for benefits
they confer (as in society’s grand reward scheme). Second, as we will argue
in section 4, what is incentivized by our version of the priority rule is not the
optimal division of cognitive labor that Strevens envisages.
2Thanks to REMOVED FOR REVIEW for discussions on this point. In the next section
we provide a particular tipping point of 2/3. While this number is arbitrary, the existence of
a tipping point is not arbitrary, and the particular number chosen will not significantly affect
results. For instance, similar results have been obtained with 3/5.
3Thanks to REMOVED FOR REVIEW for encouraging us to think about the role of
review articles.
9
3 The basic model
We formalize scientific communities as networks of agents, where nodes of the
network represent individual scientists and edges, or links, represent regular
information channels between them. These links are bidirectional and can be
thought of as representing people who talk to each other when working on a
new project, or who ask each other if looking to reference a paper on some or
other topic.
We model credit attribution contests where information about discoveries
spreads on these networks as individuals go looking for particular new results
that they happen to care about in the moment.4 In the model, we start with
an instance of multiple discovery. Two scientists each independently make some
discovery, and not knowing about the other, they each believe themselves to be
the discoverer. In the second time-step, we pick a third node at random to go
looking for news of the discovery. Whoever they are closest to in the network is
who they are going to get the news from first,5 in which case they then associate
that person with the discovery, cite them with respect to that idea, etc. Then
in the next timestep, another random node goes looking for a discovery. This
fourth scientist gets news of that discovery from whoever is closest to them
in the network that already has some belief about who made the discovery.
(The idea here is that when one goes looking for a paper on some topic x, for
instance so as to cite a discussion of that topic, one might ask their friends if
they know about a paper on x, or alternatively, one might go looking to trusted
collaborator’s papers for references, or so on.) This fourth scientist then has a
belief about who deserves credit for the discovery. This process continues until
all scientists have attributed credit. If there is a super-majority of 2/3 in favor
of one discoverer over another, we say the former wins the credit attribution
contest. If not, there is a tie.
As mentioned, this information spread occurs over networks of scientists
and the structure of the network will impact who receives credit for a discovery.
At first, we will consider basic Baraba´si-Albert networks [Baraba´si and Albert,
1999], though in later sections, we will consider alterations to that model, which
include social identity types and network change over time. As explained below,
these networks capture several important features of scientific communities.
Baraba´si-Albert networks are formed in the following way. First, we start
with a small number of fully connected nodes (nodes with all possible links
between them), m0. Then, new nodes are added one by one until the network
4This modeling choice is motivated by the historical examples above, wherein it seemed
that the scientists in the community first had to care about learning of the discovery before
credit actually came to be attributed. One might instead think information spreads more
like a diffusion process, with discoverers advertising their results to those they are connected
to on the network. The way news about a discovery spreads is likely a mix of processes
like these— particularly once one introduces self-promotion, as an incentivized strategy, to
win potential priority disputes when one perceives there to be the threat of a loss. We will
note some results from a diffusion model where relevant, and discuss the incentivization of
self-promotion in section 4.
5If there is a tie, a node is chosen at random.
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reaches a designated size. Each time a new node enters, it forms a set number
of links, m. For the results presented here, m0 = m = 4. New links are formed
via preferential attachment. That is, the more links a node already has (i.e.,
the higher its degree), the more likely it is that an entering node will form a
link with it. The probability pi that the new node is connected to node i is
proportional to:
pi =
di
Σjdj
where di is the degree of node i, and Σjdj is the sum of the degrees of all nodes
in the network (not including the new entering node). The higher the degree a
node already has, the more likely it is the new node will connect to it.
These networks have a couple of important features. First, in these net-
works, the ‘rich get richer’: nodes that already have many links are more likely
to get new links. This captures a scenario seen in many real-world networks
where the oldest members of the community tend to be the most central and
well-connected individuals in the network. Moreover, this model takes on a
natural interpretation in the context of scientific research communities: as new
researchers enter the community (e.g. as graduate students), they often seek out
social relationships with the more well established members of the community,
the oldest of which are often the most esteemed.
Second, they are scale free, meaning their degree distribution follows a power
law. In other words, there are many nodes with a few links and a few nodes
with a large number of links; there are a few ‘hubs’ in the network. Many real
world networks are (approximately) scale-free, including many types of social
networks and collaboration patterns. Among the scale-free networks, Baraba´si-
Albert networks are particularly useful for our purposes. There is evidence that
collaboration networks are formed via preferential attachment, similar to the
method of preferential attachment used in the formation of Baraba´si-Albert
networks [Newman, 2001, Baraba´si et al., 2002]. Additionally, since in later
sections we will be discussing how networks evolve over time, Baraba´si-Albert
networks are useful because they already stipulate what should happen when
new nodes enter the network.
For this basic model, we formed a network of 100 people, then ran 1000
contests on each network to estimate the likelihood of each person getting the
credit for their discovery, then performed 100 replications (i.e., we formed 100
different networks of 100 people, and ran 1000 contests on each). Figure 1 shows
the likelihood of winning for each node in the network. That is, of the contests a
node was a part of, it shows the percent of contests that node won. In this figure,
the lower number a node is, the older it is (nodes 1-4 are all the same age, as
the network started with 4 fully connected nodes). We found that, as one might
expect, older nodes were more likely to win credit attribution contests because
they tended to have a higher degree. Intuitively, when there is an instance of
multiple discovery, those scientists who are more well connected are more likely
to be given credit for their discovery because the news of their discovery travels
faster.
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Figure 1: Likelihood of winning for each node in the network
3.1 The model with types
This points to a possible disadvantage for historically underrepresented groups
(HUGs). Since older nodes tend to be members of the historically entrenched
group (HEG), the HEG members will tend to be better connected, even when
members of a HUG begin to enter the community at an equal rate later on.
This means that HEG members tend to receive credit for their discoveries at a
higher rate, even when they make the discovery at the same time as a member
of the HUG.
In order to model this intuitive argument, we introduce types into the basic
model: HEG members will be type 1 and HUG members type 2. There is noth-
ing intrinsically important about these types; they are not related to scientific
competence or likelihood of producing a scientific discovery. They are, however,
socially relevant, in that type 1 enters at a higher rate earlier in time (i.e. they
are historically entrenched, and type 2 is historically underrepresented).
In particular, we used the following logistic growth equation
P (type 2) = .5 × 1
1 + 10 × e−.05t
to determine how likely it was a new node was type 2. This represents a case
where the HUG finds it hard to enter the scientific community at first, but once
there is a sufficient number of them it becomes much easier. By the end, the
HUG enters at roughly the same rate as the HEG.6
We add one more feature of this model to reflect aspects of real world scien-
tific communities: homophily, or the preference for linking to members of one’s
own social identity group. People are homophilic in a variety of contexts (e.g.
6Nothing hangs on using this particular equation. We also used an equation where the
probability of type 2 increases quickly then asymptotes at .5, P (type 2) = 1− 1+2e−t/20
2+e−t/20 , and
results were similar.
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when forming friendships [Currarini et al., 2009]), and scientific communities
are homophilic as well, especially when it comes to co-authorship patterns [Fer-
ber and Teiman, 1980, McDowell and Smith, 1992, Boschini and Sjo¨gren, 2007,
del Carmen and Bing, 2000, West et al., 2013]. We implemented homophily in
the model by having agents place some weight, H, on their similarity to a node
in addition to their degree. We used the following to determine how much the
incoming node values linking with each of the existing nodes:
vij = H × sij∑
k sik
+ (1 −H)× dij∑
k dik
where sij = 1 if nodes i and j are of the same type and 0 otherwise.
7 The
probability that the new node links with a particular node is proportional to:
pi =
vi
Σjvj
The likelihood a node is chosen is thus determined by its value to the new
individual, including both homophilic preferences and degree, rather than just
its degree.8
For 100 of these networks, we look at 1000 credit contests where a type 1
and type 2 individual are competing for credit. Out of all these contests, type
1 wins about 42.3% of the time, type 2 wins about 16.7% of the time, with the
remaining contests consisting of ties. That is, being part of the HEG confers
a distinct advantage. More specifically, we can define HEG advantage as the
probability a HEG member wins minus the probability a HUG member wins
the credit attribution contest in an instance of multiple discovery, where the
two discoverers belong to different social identity groups. In this model, with
no homophily, the HEG advantage is 25.6%.9 In this model, homophily does
not significantly affect the results – the likelihood of each type winning stays
relatively constant as we vary homophily.
3.2 Evolving networks
Of course, scientific communities change over time. Older members of the com-
munity retire and new scientists enter the community. After a time, if the
7We incorporate homophily in this way because its influence on an incoming node’s linking
choices remains constant. Some authors incorporate homophily as a weighting of the degree
of a node, and find, similar to our results here, that homophily “makes the rich even richer”
[Kim and Altmann, 2017] and that homophily can lead to minority group members occupying
less important places in the network [Karimi et al., 2018].
8One might also think that winning a credit attribution contest would make an existing
node more “prestigious” and thus would increase its value in the eyes of incoming nodes. This
is not included in the model, but would likely intensify the effects reported here.
9This HEG advantage exists in a model where information spreads by diffusion as well, in
a simple contagion model where each discoverer tells their neighbors, who tell their neighbors
that have not already heard of the discovery, and so on (with people receiving conflicting
information choosing to assign credit randomly). However, there are less often super-majority
winners in this case. If we look at cases where one discoverer has over 50% of the community
assigning them credit, we see that type 1 wins about 54% and type 2 wins about 46% of the
time.
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HUG enters the community at a rate equal to its size in the population, it will
eventually achieve proportional representation in the scientific community. Our
questions then are: Will the HEG advantage over the HUG ever go away? If
so, how long will it take?
We incorporate network change over time into the model in the following way.
There is a maximum network size of 100 scientists, so as a new scientist enters
beyond the first 100, the oldest node is removed from the network (it “retires”)
along with all its links. When a new node enters, it then forms a set number
of links, as in the Baraba´si-Albert model. Additionally, in order to capture
the consequences on the social network structure of a scientific community that
trains its young, when the network grows beyond 50 nodes, incoming nodes also
choose an ‘advisor’. For each node the advisor is linked to, the new node has a
chance of linking with that node as well (a 50% chance for the results below) in
addition to its Baraba´si-Albert links. This captures a scientific field that grows
to a certain size, becomes established, then begins to adopt practices to train
new generations of scientists.10
How long will the HEG advantage persist when the network evolves? There
are many factors to consider. We will talk about HEG advantage over genera-
tions of the scientific community. A generation is defined as the time it takes
to have a complete turnover of scientists. Since in each time-step the oldest
scientist retires and a new scientists enters, with 100 scientists a generation is
100 time-steps.
Let us first consider a case where the HUG approaches 50% of the population,
where by timestep 100 (after 1 generation) they are entering in equal proportions
and after 2 generations they have achieved equal representation. For each level
of homophily, we formed 250 networks. For each of these networks, we performed
250 credit attribution contests (where a type 1 and type 2 individual were
competing for credit) every 25 rounds to get an idea of how likely it was that
each social identity group would get credit for their discovery, and how these
chances changed over time. Figure 2 shows what happens in this case.
We find that the HEG advantage disappears quickly over time. Interestingly,
the HUG has an advantage for a short period of time (that is, the HEG advan-
tage goes negative). As homophily increases, this temporary HUG advantage
increases. This is likely because, when there are very few members of this group
for the initial time period, the one or two that exist serve as focal points for
the incoming members. As the HUG starts entering at higher rates, these focal
points become highly connected to all the new people such that if a member
of their social identity group makes a discovery, they will know about it. Since
10Nothing depends on this particular way of doing things. For instance, we obtained similar
results when new nodes used the following copying mechanism to create new links, modified
from Kumar et al. [2000]. When a new node enters the network it chooses a ‘prototype’ (its
advisor) via the Baraba´si-Albert procedure and forms a link with their advisor. Then, it
copies 0− 3 randomly chosen links from its advisor (how many is chosen randomly, subject to
the condition that the advisor had enough links). Then, if the new node still had less than m
links, they formed more links according to the Baraba´si-Albert procedure (up to m = 4 total).
The results of this model are very similar to the ones presented below, although homophily
has slightly less of an effect on the HEG advantage.
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Figure 2: HEG advantage over time, for different levels of homophily, where the
HUG is 50% of the population.
these focal individuals are so highly connected, they are likely to have at least
some connections with new HEG members despite homophily, because people
still do care to some extent about forming links with highly connected people.
So news of the HUG members’ discoveries can spread.
That the HEG advantage disappears quickly in this case looks somewhat
promising — if we can get equal representation, eventually no group is disad-
vantaged.11 A situation like this is achievable if we are thinking about men and
women, but not if we are thinking about minority groups like racial minorities,
people with disabilities, etc. In these cases, we can talk about what happens if
proportional, rather than equal, representation is achieved.
The situation is different when the HUG is a minority group. In this case,
even when the HUG achieves proportional representation within two genera-
tions, the HEG advantage can be more severe and last longer, especially in the
presence of strong homophily. As seen in figure 3, when homophily is low, the
HEG advantage disappears around when the HUG achieves proportional rep-
resentation (with no real period of advantage for the HUG). But as homophily
increases, the HEG advantage can persist over time, meaning the HUG is less
likely to get credit for their discoveries.
4 Concluding remarks
Strevens [2003] interprets the priority rule in science as a behavior regulator
for the scientific community, part of a grand reward scheme which benefits
11It has been argued that in other situations, such as when there is a discriminatory bar-
gaining norm in a community of scientists, merely increasing representation of the minority
group will not eliminate inequalities [Schneider et al., 2019].
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Figure 3: HEG advantage over time, for different levels of homophily, where the
HUG is 10% of the population.
society by adequately structuring the distribution of intellectual labor across
pre-existing research programs. We have demonstrated that prestige does not
necessarily go to who deserves it. People are not always rewarded based on the
benefit they confer, and so it is difficult to regard the priority rule as an instance
of a grand reward scheme that resonates with our notions of fairness.
There is also the further question of whether the priority rule can serve the
function of dividing cognitive labor in the way Strevens suggests.12 In order
for the priority rule to provide this benefit, it must be the case that scientists
believe they will receive credit for their discovery, so that they decide which
research program to join based on the likelihood of making a discovery. Merton
[1957] already provides some evidence that scientists believe recognition is not
automatic after discovery, and (to the contrary) is something that is more likely
for some than others. He quotes Norbert Weiner explaining:
I was competitive beyond the run of younger mathematicians, and I
knew equally that this was not a very pretty attitude. However, it
was not an attitude which I was free to assume or to reject. I was
quite aware that I was an out among ins and I would get no shred
of recognition that I did not force (p. 649).
If instead scientists believe the correct picture of credit assignment is closer
to our version of the priority rule (and consequently that news of their discovery
must spread through the scientific network, with more well-connected scientists
more likely to receive credit when there is a close race), Strevens’s optimal divi-
sion of labor may not be what is incentivized. For instance, scientists motivated
by credit might be incentivized to link with well-connected people – this might
12Thanks to REMOVED FOR REVIEW for this point.
16
be better achieved by joining a research program that already has a lot of fol-
lowers, even if the chance of making a discovery in the other research program
is better. Alternatively, scientists might be incentivized to pick a research pro-
gram with fewer well-connected people, so as to decrease the likelihood that the
prestige associated with their potential discovery will be “scooped” by another
who is in a better position to capture it.
In the case of socially diverse communities, per the considerations in section
3, members of minority groups should, at first pass and in ignorance about their
precise location in the social network, be disincentived to join research programs
that feature large numbers of scientists from the majority group. This disinsen-
tive may often be in tension with those same scientists’ considerations of the
“intrinsic potentials” of those programs, as considered by Strevens. These com-
peting incentives may eventually lead to clustering into sub-disciplines accord-
ing to social identity. Following the arguments given by Schneider et al. [2019],
there is some historical precedent to suggest that such clustering is ultimately
detrimental to the general state of our scientific knowledge across disciplines.
Absent further study, it is difficult to discern which of these various factors
(or others) clearly dominates in the decision-making of scientists, and even more
difficult to suss out the epistemic consequences of such decision-making; we
leave this investigation for future work. Our point is that these considerations
are absent in Strevens’s model, and that the extent to which any such strategies
are motivated at all can only be evaluated in a model of the priority rule which
takes into account individual scientists’ credit attributions. Altogether, the
epistemic benefits of the priority rule that Strevens sees, in terms of maximizing
the likelihood of a discovery, are not guaranteed when we take seriously the
implications of a distributive reading of the statement: The scientific community
disburses prestige.
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